Apple Studio’s Casting Decision Protected By The First
Amendment
Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC, 110 Cal. App.
5th 183 (2025)
In early 2022, Apple Studios LLC conditionally offered actor
Brent Sexton the role of U.S. President Andrew Johnson in its
production of”Manhunt,” a limited streaming series about
the hunt for John Wilkes Booth following the assassination of
Abraham Lincoln. One of the conditions for Sexton’s casting was
that he be fully vaccinated in compliance with Apple’s
mandatory on-set vaccination policy. Sexton refused to get
vaccinated, seeking an exemption on medical grounds. After
considering Sexton’s request, Apple ultimately decided that an
unvaccinated actor could not safely be accommodated on set and
withdrew Sexton’s offer. Sexton sued Apple for disability
discrimination and related claims.
In response, Apple filed a motion to strike Sexton’s
complaint under California’s anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) law. The trial court
denied Apple’s motion, but the Court of Appealreversed, holding
that: (1) Apple’s decision not to cast Sexton was in fact
“protected expressive conduct” under the First Amendment;
and (2) Sexton’s claims lacked merit because, by remaining
unvaccinated, he failed to meet the “safety”
qualification required for the job he sought.
The Court concluded that Apple’s decision not to cast Sexton
furthered free speech in two ways. First, the choice of how to
portray Andrew Johnson— a controversial and important
historical figure— was a creative endeavor in and of itself,
with the selection of different actors “contribut[ing] to the
public issue of how contemporary viewers might conceive of
Johnson.” Second, by making vaccination mandatory on
the”Manhunt”set, “Apple took a stand” on the
ongoing public debate about vaccination policy. In addition to
finding Apple’s actions to be protected as expressive conduct,
the Court also concluded that Sexton’s discrimination claims
failed on the merits. A key element for a meritorious employment
discrimination claim is that the plaintiff show that he or she is
qualifiedfor the position. Here, the Court found that, because
Sexton was unvaccinated, he was not qualified for the job he
sought.
Judge’s “Extreme and Bizarre” Comments Result In
Reversal Of $10 Million Verdict
Odom v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 110 Cal. App.
5th 470 (2025)
Sabrena Odom, a tenured Los Angeles Community College
(“LACC”) professor, sued LACC and one of its top
administrators for sexual harassment and retaliation. After a
three-week trial, the jury awarded plaintiff a total of $10 million
for past and future mental suffering and emotional distress
damages. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the trial judge
improperly admitted 20-year-old newspaper articles regarding the
administrator-defendant’s stalking and prior conviction for
sexual assault. The judge also erred in allowing “me too”
testimony from a student at LACC regarding her complaint against a
different administrator.
The Court held the trial court committed additional error when
the judge made “extreme and bizarre” racial and
gender-based comments to defendant’s counsel, a Black woman,
during the post-judgment phase of trial. Among other things, the
judge talked about “miscegenation” and the societal
impact of mixed-race football players as well as his support for
Black Lives Matter. He also repeated an offensive joke he heard as
a young lawyer about female secretaries doing a better job
providing sexual favors than typing. The judge eventually recused
himself after defendant’s counsel moved to disqualify him.
Finally, the Court of Appeal found the $10 million jury award
for mental suffering and emotional distress to be
“excessive” in that plaintiff continued to work through
the close of trial and proved no economic damages. The Court agreed
with defendants that there is no precedent for this high of an
award absent economic or debilitating injuries, and the award was
grossly disproportionate to awards in comparable cases; the Court
remanded for a new trial.
Unsigned Contract Cannot Form Basis For Summary Judgment
De la Cruz v. Mission Hills Shopping Ctr. LLC, 2025 WL
1218040 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025)
Myranda De la Cruz tripped on a pothole in a Mission Hills
shopping center parking lot. There was an exculpatory clause in a
contract between De la Cruz’s employer (a tenant in the
shopping center) and the shopping center that relieved the shopping
center of any liability for negligent or wrongful acts. De la Cruz
was neither a party nor signatory to the contract, which formed the
basis for the shopping center’s successful motion for summary
judgment. In a remarkably concise four-paragraph opinion from
Justice John Shepard Wiley Jr., the Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court, holding that the shopping center had not established
that De la Cruz was bound by a contract she did not sign —
even though De la Cruz apparently failed to make that argument
before the trial court.
Company’s President And CFO Are Liable For Filing
Inaccurate Tax Forms
Nazaryan v. FemtoMetrix, Inc., 2025 WL 1177060 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2025)
Hovik Nazaryan sued his former employer and several of its
officers and a member of the board of directors after the parties
settled a prior dispute between them and the defendants agreed to
classify the settlement proceeds as “Founder’s Stock”
and not “compensation, salary or income for [Nazaryan’s]
services to FemtoMetrix.” The defendants subsequently issued
1099-MISC forms characterizing the settlement proceeds as
“non-employee compensation.” Nazaryan sued and claimed
the company and its officers breached the settlement agreement and
violated Internal Revenue Code § 7434 by filing
“fraudulent 1099 forms.” The trial court entered judgment
for Nazaryan, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the
trial court did not err by finding the company’s president and
its CFO liable under IRC § 7434.
Plaintiffs Waived Right To Arbitrate By Litigating In
Court
Hofer v. Boladian, 2025 WL 1354795 (Cal. Ct. App.
2025)
Plaintiffs in this case initiated litigation against defendants,
notwithstanding the existence of binding arbitration agreements
between the parties. For six months following the filing of the
litigation, plaintiffs sought two forms of preliminary injunctive
relief, opposed a demurrer, propounded more than 700 discovery
requests, demanded a jury trial in their case management conference
statement, represented they would be litigating substantive motions
in court and posted jury fees. It was not until the opposing party
filed a cross-complaint that plaintiffs filed a motion to compel
arbitration. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that
plaintiffs’ conduct in the case constituted a waiver under
Quach v. California Com. Club, Inc., 16 Cal.
5th 562 (2024), and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
See also Ford v. The Silver F, Inc., 110 Cal. App.
5th 553 (2025) (motion to compel arbitration of
individual PAGA claim was properly denied because the arbitration
agreement specifically excluded all PAGA claims); Sanders v.
Superior Court, 2025 WL 1303386 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025) (statute
requiring payment of arbitration fees within 30 days (Cal. Code
Civ. Proc. § 1281.98) is not preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act).
Federal Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Confirm Zero-Dollar
Arbitration Award
Tesla Motors, Inc. v. Balan, 134 F.4th 558 (9th Cir.
2025)
Tesla Motors and Elon Musk prevailed in an arbitration
proceeding against a former employee based on California’s
one-year statute of limitations. Tesla and Musk subsequently
petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California to confirm the arbitration award in their
favor. The district court granted the petition to confirm, but the
Ninth Circuit vacated the order and remanded the action to the
district court with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction based on the failure to satisfy the $75,000
amount-in-controversy requirement necessary to establish diversity
jurisdiction in federal court.
Prospective Meal Period Waiver Is Enforceable
Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 5th
899 (2025)
La Kimba Bradsbery and Cheri Brakensiek sued their former
employer (Vicar Operating, Inc.) in a putative class action,
alleging that Vicar had failed to provide them with meal periods
for shifts between five and six hours. Vicar responded that
plaintiffs had prospectively waived in writing all waivable meal
periods throughout their employment with Vicar. The prospective
waivers provided that plaintiffs could revoke the agreement at any
time. The trial court determined the waiver was valid and ruled in
favor of Vicar. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
“revocable, prospective waivers are enforceable in the absence
of any evidence the waivers are unconscionable or unduly
coercive.”
PAGA Plaintiff Must Have Viable Individual Claim To Represent
Other Employees
Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Grp., LLC, 110 Cal.
App. 5th 932 (2025)
Corbin Williams sued his former employer (Alacrity Solutions
Group, LLC) for various wage and hour violations. However, Williams
failed to provide written notice of his claims to the state Labor
& Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) until more than a year
had passed since the end of his employment with Alacrity, thus
barring any individual claims he may have had under the Private
Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Williams subsequently filed a PAGA
claim only on behalf of “other current and former
employees” but, according to the Court of Appeal,
“critically, not on his own behalf.” Alacrity filed a
demurrer in response to the complaint on the ground that the
purported representative action that Williams asserted was barred
by the one-year statute of limitations in that he lacked standing
to assert any claim (individual or representative) under the
statute. The trial court sustained the demurrer to the complaint
without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.
Other recent PAGA developments: Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.,
109 Cal. App. 5th 317 (2025) (plaintiff in parallel PAGA
action lacks standing to challenge settlement of another
employee’s PAGA suit (citing Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc.,
16 Cal. 5th 664 (2024)); Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. 2025 WL 1392271 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025) (prevailing party
employer may not recover its costs from LWDA, which was not a party
to the action); Chavez v. Hi-Grade Materials Co., 2025 WL
1231999 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025) (putative class action plaintiff
cannot “ring the death knell” for the entire class by
voluntarily dismissing all remaining representative claims after
class certification has been denied).
California Employment Law Notes
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