This trade conflict has placed Latin America in a challenging position. While US President Donald Trump has close allies in the region, such as Argentina’s President Javier Milei and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, others in Latin America have sought to diversify their partners. For example, Petro recently confirmed Colombia’s joining of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The BRI has expanded in the region over the past decade, and Colombia will become the 23rd CELAC country to sign up.
The Belt and Road Initiative
First announced by Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a global infrastructure development strategy designed to boost trade and economic growth.
“Belt” refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt – a series of overland routes linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the Middle East; “Road” acknowledges the 21st-century maritime Silk Road – a sea route connecting China’s southern coast to the Mediterranean via East Africa.
A vast range of projects, including motorways, ports, power plants and factories, have been described as being part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Find our reporting on BRI projects – and China’s growing role in global development and environmental governance – here.
Dialogue Earth consulted Francisco Urdinez, who directs the Millennium Nucleus on the Impacts of China in Latin America, an interdisciplinary research initiative. He says the summit’s main goal was to “show the world that multilateralism still exists and that free trade is still possible”.
Rebecca Ray, senior academic researcher for the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, agrees: “With trade barriers all over the place, it’s an important moment to come together and reaffirm commitment to multilateralism. The region is committing to pragmatic, open, non-discriminatory relations with the world to achieve its goals.”
Further investments
For Parsifal D’Sola Alvarado, executive director of the Andrés Bello Foundation (FAB)’s Latin American Chinese Research Center, the most important parts of the summit were the bilateral interactions that the leaders of Brazil, Colombia and Chile each had with China. “The rest was just statements from the governments and a lack of definitions,” Alvarado adds.
Companies from China, Brazil’s primary trading partner, expressed their intention to invest approximately US$4.5 billion in various sectors of the Brazilian economy.
According to the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (ApexBrasil), that will include renewable energy, mining, automobiles, food, logistics and the health sector.
Brazil also issued a joint statement with China on the margins of the summit, in which both countries agreed to cooperate on projects related to the environment, energy transition and science and technology, among other areas.
Brazil has so far chosen not to join the BRI. But the country still desires closer ties with China, says political scientist and international relations professor Maurício Santoro: “In recent years, we have seen a diversification of Chinese investments in Brazil, such as in the electric vehicle sector. Major car manufacturers such as BYD are building factories in the country.”
The Chile-China Business Forum also took place in Beijing earlier this month, organised by the Boric administration. At the forum, the Chilean president lauded multilateralism and free trade, and the reciprocal benefits they bring. Both countries indicated a willingness to collaborate on solutions to challenges facing the energy transition and the digital transformation, among other issues.
Meanwhile, Nicaragua, which resumed diplomatic relations with China in 2021, signed four agreements with Chinese companies on the margins of the summit, including a deal with Yutong on electric vehicles. Hydroelectric and mining deals were also floated.
Margaret Myers, managing director of the Johns Hopkins University’s Institute for America, China and the Future of Global Affairs, notes China’s lower credit commitment compared to previous summits. But she says it remains significant given the US’ withdrawal of certain forms of assistance, such as USAID, and the slow progress of Europe’s Global Gateway programme.
“Whether China’s billions materialise or not will depend on multiple factors,” says Myers, “including China’s own economic prospects, the extent to which bankable projects are available to Chinese companies, and the interests of individual countries and localities. But China seems committed to continued engagement with the region.”
This article was originally published on Dialogue Earth under a Creative Commons licence.
