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The atmosphere in Parliament turned electric. Vajpayee left his seat to consult aides and returned swiftly. His statement was brief but charged: “If this is true, then India’s policy has been vindicated.”
What had begun as an Indian assertion of nuclear dominance had now triggered the very reaction Delhi had feared: a regional arms race, and with it, the beginning of a new era — one in which Pakistan could provoke India, and New Delhi would be forced to measure every response.
Nuclear blackmail and the freedom to provoke
Since that day — May 28, 1998 — Pakistan’s nuclear capability has functioned as more than just a deterrent. It has been a shield behind which Pakistan has waged asymmetric warfare, supported cross-border terrorism, and avoided large-scale retaliation from its much larger neighbour.Whether it was the Kargil War a year later, the 2001 Parliament attack, Mumbai attacks in 2008, or the Pahalgam massacre of April, 2025, India’s retaliatory calculus has always had one dark shadow looming over it: the threat of a nuclear-armed adversary.And Pakistani leaders haven’t shied away from brandishing that threat time and again. In 2016, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared: “We haven’t kept the devices just as showpieces. But if our safety is threatened, we will annihilate them [India].” In 2018, when then Indian Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat remarked about calling Pakistan’s “nuclear bluff,” Pakistani Army General Asif Munir responded on X: “Very irresponsible statement… amounts to invitation for nuclear encounter. If that is what they desire, they are welcome to test our resolve.” In 2019, then Railway Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed claimed that his country possessed “125-250 gram atom bombs” that may hit a targeted area in India, pointing at Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons. Then came Shazia Marri, a minister in the Pakistani government, who said during a public broadcast in 2022: “India should not forget that Pakistan has an atom bomb. Our nuclear status is not meant to remain silent.” As recently as in 2025, Hanif Abbasi, a senior Pakistani official, publicly warned that Pakistan’s arsenal — including the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles — was “ready to strike Indian cities” if provoked.
These were not offhand remarks. They form a pattern — a doctrine of deterrence that borders on nuclear blackmail, allowing Pakistan to strike from the shadows while shielding itself from direct consequences.
A bomb born of defeat — and an obsession with parity
Pakistan’s nuclear ambition began, not in the deserts of Balochistan, but in the ashes of war. The year was 1971. Pakistan had just suffered its most devastating military defeat — the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh — with India’s military intervention tipping the balance. The loss broke more than just territory; it shattered the myth of strategic parity between the two neighbours.
In 1972, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then President of Pakistan, made a secret decision. As reported by The New York Times in May 29, 1998, Bhutto had long believed that the Islamic world needed its own bomb — to stand toe-to-toe with what he called “Christian, Communist and Hindu bombs”.
Bhutto set Pakistan on a covert nuclear path, vowing that his nation would build an “Islamic bomb” if needed.
But Bhutto’s aspirations to make Pakistan a nuclear armed state had been long overdue. It was, in fact, in 1965 that he first promised to make Islamabad a nuclear power. “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no alternative,” Bhutto had said. This was long before the Indian government under then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi conducted its first nuclear tests in Pokhran, codenamed the ‘Smiling Buddha’.
Over the next two decades, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s “nuclear father,” orchestrated a sprawling procurement network. According to Western intelligence reports cited by NYT, Khan photocopied classified uranium enrichment designs while working at a centrifuge facility in the Netherlands in the 1970s.
Aided by generous funding allegedly from Libya and Saudi Arabia, and, crucially, Chinese technical assistance (which Beijing denies), Pakistan built a uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, and later, a plutonium production reactor at Khushab. By 1983–84, Pakistan had already gained the capability to assemble a bomb. In 1987, Abdul Qadeer Khan was quoted as saying, “Nobody can undo Pakistan… We are here to stay. Be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened.”
The doctrine has been further reinforced by statements from political leaders. In 1990, Benazir Bhutto, then prime minister, sent her foreign minister to India to pressure New Delhi on Kashmir issues, warning that “war clouds would hover over the sub-continent if timely action was not taken”.
By 1990, CIA estimates suggested Islamabad had 7–12 nuclear warheads.
The West knew, but looked away
Unlike India’s stealthy Pokhran-II tests — which famously evaded US satellite surveillance, catching even the CIA off guard — Pakistan’s preparations for Chagai were monitored in real time by Western intelligence.
American satellites observed concrete being poured into test shafts 24 hours prior to the blasts. US President Bill Clinton even made a last-minute appeal, offering $5 billion in aid if Pakistan refrained. But then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif refused. “Today, we have evened the score with India,” Sharif declared shortly after the five blasts rocked the Chagai Hills at 3:30 PM local time. The tests were carried out in secret, with sub-assembly of nuclear devices transported to the Chagai Hills under tight security.
Within hours, Pakistani media hailed it as the realisation of the late Bhutto’s dream. Crowds poured into the streets, celebratory gunfire rang out, and mosques held impromptu thanksgiving prayers.
The successful detonation of the nuclear devices marked Pakistan’s entry into the group of nuclear-armed nations and was hailed as a significant achievement by the Pakistani government and military. The Chagai tests and the subsequent development of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have had profound implications for the region. They have contributed to an arms race in South Asia, with India enhancing its own nuclear capabilities in response.
The presence of nuclear weapons has also complicated the dynamics of regional conflicts, making military confrontations riskier and potentially catastrophic. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence has created a delicate balance, where any miscalculation or escalation could have devastating consequences.
